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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GLENDA W. GILES, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : COURT OF APPEALS 
v. : 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : Case No. 940468-CA 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB, and 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION FUND : 
OF UTAH, Category 7 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Industrial 
Commission in this workers' compensation proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 35-1-86 (1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Industrial Commission commit error and abuse its discretion by not 
referring this case back to the medical panel for consideration of the new material 
medical evidence obtained and submitted by the Appellant after the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order were issued by the Administrative Law Judge? The 
standard for review is abuse of discretion, King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2D 
1281 (Ut.App. 1993) and Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), U.C.A. (1987). 
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2. Did the Industrial Commission misapply the holding of Stokes v. Board of 
Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Ut. App. 1992) in denying medical treatment and compensation 
for psychiatric problems that the medical panel concluded that the Appellant suffers 
from as a result of her industrial incident by its conclusion that she had an abnormal 
reaction to a normal event? The standard for review is substantial evidence, Smallwood 
v. Industrial Commission. 8451 P.2d 716 (Ut. App. 1992) and 63-46b-16(4)(g), U.C.A. 
(1987). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Appellant submits that the following statute may be determinative of the central 
issue in this proceeding: 
Section 35-1-78(1), U.C.A. (1994): 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall 
be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time 
to time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records 
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other 
than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been 
filed as in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Proceedings 
This appeal involves a full denial of benefits in a workers1 compensation claim 
and is from a final Order of the Industrial Commission affirming the Administrative 
Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and denying the 
Appellant's Motion for Review and Motion for Reconsideration. 
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(b) Course of Proceedings 
1. On June 9, 1992, Mrs. Giles filed an Application for Hearing with the 
Industrial Commission seeking workers' compensation benefits for an industrial injury 
sustained in September of 1991 while employed by the Oakridge Country Club. R5. 
The Respondents Oakridge Country Club and/or the Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah denied that the applicant had sustained a compensable industrial injury and that 
the incident occurred as she described. R8,9. 
2. On January 4, 1993, a hearing was held before the Honorable Timothy 
C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. R228-365. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued 
preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the case to a medical panel. R17-25 The 
medical panel met with the applicant in February of 1993 and issued a report which was 
circulated to the parties in April of 1993. R26-42. On July 15, 1993, the ALJ issued his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order wherein he fully denied Mrs. Giles' 
claim for benefits.R104-117. 
3. Mrs. Giles thereafter retained new counsel who filed a Motion for 
Review on Monday, August 16, 1993. R118-121and R619-622 and R674-681. Among 
other things, in the motion, Mrs. Giles stated that she had seen a new doctor on July 
14, 1993 and would soon be undergoing new tests at the University of California, 
Irvine. These tests would include a PET scan, which was not available in Utah at that 
time. In the Motion, it was requested that the Industrial Commission take no further 
action on the case until the test results were released and could be submitted. R118-121. 
4. On December 14, 1993 Mrs. Giles filed a Supplement to the Applicant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Review. This supplement contained the 
reports and test results generated as a result of Mrs. Giles' testing at the University of 
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California, Irvine. It was submitted as new and previously unavailable evidence 
showing that the Applicant sustained brain damage as a result of the chlorine gas 
episode at the Oak Ridge Country Club in September of 1991. R127-150. 
5. The Industrial Commission issued its Order Denying Motion for Review 
on June 6, 1994. R165-167. On Monday June 27, 1994, the Applicant submitted a 
Request for Reconsideration. Included in this pleading were new reports from a 
neurotoxicologist/ immunotoxicologist from California who wrote a report on June 
21, 1994 relative to further examination and testing of Mrs. Giles in 1994. R154-164. It 
was submitted as further support for the new evidence submitted in the December 14, 
1993 Supplement mentioned above. 
6 An Order denying the Request for Reconsideration was issued by the 
Indust-rial Commission on July 14, 1994. R171-172. 
7. The Petition for Writ of Review was filed with this Court on August 12, 
1994. On September 9, 1994, this Court issued a Sue Sponte Motion for Summary 
Disposition. The parties responded to the motion within the time allowed and the 
Motion was denied by this Court on October 26, 1994. 
(c) Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. Glenda Giles was an employee of the Oakridge Country Club as of 
September 7, 1991. She was hired on June 3, 1991 to work as office manager for the 
organization. R235. 
2. On the morning of September 7, 1991, there was a brief power outage at 
the country club. Later that morning, Mrs. Giles directed a co-employee, Paul Spencer, 
to deliver some materials to the basement of the building. R279. Mr. Spencer shortly 
returned and reported that there was a chlorine gas leak in the basement where the 
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swimming pool machinery and supplies were kept. R280. Mr. Spencer and another 
employee then went to attempt to turn off the chlorine. R281. After they left, as she 
believed, for the basement, Mrs. Giles spoke with the pool manager who advised her to 
get some fans to air out the basement. She then spoke with a construction worker, who 
was there as part of a remodeling crew, about getting some fans. He advised her to call 
the fire department and have an oxygen breathing mask brought as "you don't mess 
with chlorine gas." R281,282. 
3. Mrs. Giles became concerned when the two co-employees didn't return 
and so she determined to go down to the basement to look for them. She told a 
secretary to call the paramedics if she wasn't back in five minutes. She then went into 
the basement and called several times for the two men in the dimly lit basement. She 
testified that by then she was having trouble breathing; her nose was running, her eyes 
were running, she had a headache and she felt dizzy. She then took a deep breath and 
screamed the names of the two men. She heard one answer and then learned that they 
were not in the basement, but were outside in the parking lot. She later learned that 
the turnoff valve for the chlorine bottle was outside of the building. R282,283. 
4. Later, men from the fire department arrived and some employees were 
evacuated from the building. Mrs. Giles testified that she was feeling nauseated at that 
time and two firemen had her lie down. She was later taken to Humana Health Davis 
North for medical treatment. She received medical care from various providers after 
that. She had a variety of physical and mental complaints including dizziness, 
headaches, anxiety attacks, difficulty with memory, decreased concentration, stuttering 
and stammering, blurred vision, and sensitivity to some fumes. R283,285. 
5. Following the evidentiary hearing held before the Industrial 
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Commission, the Administrative Law Judge issued preliminary Findings of Fact (R17-
25) wherein he concluded that Mrs. Giles wasn't exposed to chlorine gas per se, but 
rather that she was exposed to the smell of what he termed "superchlorinated water." 
This was based on his finding that the hose to the chlorine tank didn't rupture, but 
rather the rupture concerned a line containing water that has been mixed with chlorine 
gas that would be pumped into the swimming pool. These preliminary Findings of 
Fact were sent to the medical panel appointed by the Judge, along with the medical 
records. The panel was commissioned to determine if Mrs. Giles' health problems were 
medically related to the September 7, 1991 industrial accident. R17-25. 
6. The February, 1993 report of the medical panel concluded that none of 
the Appellant's complaints were directly related to the industrial accident. R26-46. 
They found no evidence in the medical records, and from blood gas studies, that she has 
damage from the exposure to the fumes from the superchlorinated water. The panel did 
feel that because of the Appellant's fear that she had been exposed to chlorine gas, and 
because of the behavior of emergency personnel at the scene, and because she was given 
the impression that something was wrong with her blood gases, she had a psychiatric 
injury. The panel concluded that the events of the episode created a "mental stress 
arising out of her employment and was beyond that ordinarily encountered by people 
in life and employment in general." R40. Her past history, which was positive for some 
psychiatric problems and somatic complaints, made her vulnerable to the events of the 
episode on September 7, 1991. R41. As a result, the panel suggested that Mrs. Giles be 
given psychiatric counseling for up to six months. R41. 
7. Mrs. Giles was seen by Dr. Richard A. Nelson, M.D. of Billings, 
Montana on July 14, 1993 for further study of her complaints. R619-622. He felt she 
6 
might have a low level organic mental syndrome due to possible chlorine gas exposure. 
He recommended additional tests that she had not had before. These included a so-
called P-300 and Neurometries EEG. In that report he stated that if the results of those 
tests proved to be abnormal, he might refer her for a PET (positron emission 
tomography, R-130) scan "to see if a follow up would show alterations in the sites that 
one would expect to see with any anoxic episodes associated with acute pulmonary 
embarrassment during the time of her exposure to the chlorine gas." R-679. As a result 
of the tests, which Dr. Nelson felt showed abnormal findings (R610-609), Mrs. Giles 
was referred to the University of California, Irvine for the PET scan. R601. 
8. The PET scan was performed on August 24, 1993 in California. 
R149,150. On December 2, 1993 Dr. Nelson issued a report outlining his conclusions as 
a result of the findings from the PET scan. The results showed 13 areas of abnormal 
metabolism in Mrs. Giles1 brain. Most are in "the anterior portion of the head and 
medial temporal regions which are the limbic structures and have to do with executive 
function and psychiatric and psychologic functioning in the individual along with 
memory, concentration and attention." R-129 to 148. Dr. Nelson concluded that she 
has actual organic changes in her brain, shown both electrophysiciologically as well as 
metabolically. He found that her medical history is negative for other potential causes 
of this damage1, and concluded that this damage was because of the work exposure of 
September 7, 1991.R-131. 
9. At the time the Appellant filed her Motion for Reconsideration on June 
27, 1994, she included with the motion a June 21, 1994 report by Dr. Gunnar Heuser, 
iOther possible causal factors of such damage listed by Dr. Nelson are cerebral concussion, meningitis, 
encephalitis, diabetes with hypoglycemia, seizure disorders, smoking, alcoholism and drug use. He 
found none of these in her history. The record on appeal does not disclose, as far as counsel can see, any 
evidence of any of these factors in the Applicant's medical history. 
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M.D., a neurotoxicologist/immunologist in California. In his report, he concludes, 
based upon the prior testing ordered by Dr. Nelson, and on a 5/2/94 SPECT scan, that 
Mrs. Giles has objective brain abnormalities, all of which could only be due to toxic 
exposure from the chlorine exposure episode. He felt that they could not be due to 
disease, metabolic origin or other causes. R157-162. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. This case should have been sent back by the Industrial Commission to 
the medical panel in light of the new evidence submitted by the Applicant. The reports 
resulting from the testing were not available until after the order denying benefits was 
issued by the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission clearly had and has 
jurisdiction to send the case back for further consideration of the medical issues and it 
was manifest error and abuse of discretion for the Commission to fail to do so. 
2. The Industrial Commission misapplied the law in Stokes in denying 
psychiatric counseling and benefits to Mrs. Giles by concluding that she had an 
abnormal reaction to normal events when the evidence in the record supports the 
conclusion that the events of the day in question constituted an abnormal event The 
denial of benefits on this issue should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE REFERRED THE CASE 
BACK TO THE MEDICAL PANEL IN LIGHT OF THE NEW EVIDENCE 
SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION FOR REVIEW. TO 
FAIL TO DO SO WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ERROR. 
The Industrial Commission was presented new and material evidence. It 
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has and had authority to send the case back to the medical panel and should have 
made the referral. 
Section 35-1-78, U.C.A. provides in pertinent part: 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case 
shall be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, 
may from time to time modify or change its former findings and 
orders. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 733 
P.2d 158 (Utah 1987) examined this section in connection with the question of 
whether new evidence may be submitted and considered by the Industrial 
Commission after an order has been issued. 
The Spencer case involved an injured truck driver who sought permanent 
total disability benefits. After an evidentiary hearing, and after consideration by 
a medical panel, the administrative law judge concluded "that the weight of the 
evidence vitiates a finding of tentative permanent and total disability..." 
However, some permanent partial disability benefits and medical benefits were 
awarded. 
A few months later, Mr. Spencer applied for a new hearing for payment 
of certain medical expenses. He later had a vocational rehabilitation workup 
which found him to be unemployable. His attorney submitted the 
rehabilitation report to the Industrial Commission with the request that the 
issue of permanent total disability be heard at an upcoming hearing. Instead, the 
administrative law judge dismissed the application on the grounds of res judicata. 
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He indicated that if the applicant therein had wanted to have that report 
considered, he should have requested a continuance, and because there had been 
no change in the applicant's condition, the provisions of Section 35-1-78 were 
inapplicable. Mr. Spencer thereafter filed a motion for review, which was 
denied, and appeal was then taken to the Supreme Court. 
In reversing the Industrial Commission, the Court ruled that the power 
given the Industrial Commission by Section 35-1-78 to modify awards is not an 
arbitrary power, "but a power wedded to the duty to examine credible evidence. 
Under well- established principles of stare decisis, the basis of modification is 
provided by evidence of some significant change or new development in the 
claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's inadequacy." Spencer, supra. 
The Court further held that the report submitted by the applicant after 
the initial order denying permanent total disability benefits was not to be 
rejected under the doctrine of res judicata. It stated: 
"Inherent in the Workmen's Compensation Act is the recognition 
that industrial injuries cannot always be diagnosed with absolute 
certainty, nor their consequences predicted with complete 
certainty, and therefore the rule of res judicata is not ordinarily 
applicable in proceedings of this kind." 
Spencer, supra. 
The record in this case shows that the ALJ entered an order concluding that 
Mrs. Giles did not sustain a compensable industrial injury. It was based on the finding 
that there was no direct chlorine leak into the atmosphere, and the medical panel's 
conclusion that the actual exposure to the superchlorinated water did not cause or 
exacerbate any of the Applicant's health problems. The medical panel found nothing 
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objective in the medical records to substantiate any findings of damage involving seizure 
disorders, respiratory damage, nor organic brain damage from the event. R-40. 
The new evidence submitted along with the Motion for Review and Motion for 
Reconsideration is significant when viewed in this light. This evidence is the result of 
different objective tests: the neurometric EEG, the P-300 (which is a type of brain scan), 
the PET scan, and the SPECT scan. These tests provide the first clinical objective data 
of damage from the chlorine episode. They were not available to the medical panel 
because the testing had not been done before that time. They provide hard evidence 
that regardless of how Mrs. Giles' exposure is characterized - be it inhalation of chlorine 
gas, or fumes from superchlorinated water - she suffered brain damage as a result. 
This type of evidence is akin to DNA testing that makes it possible, sometimes 
many years after the original event, to determine paternity when other evidence 
originally available was inconclusive or negative. Although we are not saying that there 
may not be rebuttal evidence that the employer/carrier may be able to submit with 
respect to these tests and their results, we respectfully assert that this evidence is 
positive objective proof that in the eyes of a medical panel could have a major impact 
on their assessment of the cause of some of Mrs. Giles' health complaints. The 
Industrial Commission is not free to slough it off by saying that it should have been 
submitted it the time of the evidentiary hearing. See R-166. She was not sent for the 
tests until long after the hearing conducted by the ALJ and after the report of the 
medical panel. 
The Industrial Commission has a duty to examine credible evidence. Because 
neither the Commissioners, nor the ALJ are medical doctors, the medical panel is to be 
utilized when a significant medical issue is involved. Rule 568-1-9, Utah Administrative 
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Code. Although the Industrial Commission has the ultimate responsibility to decide 
cases, it may be an abuse of discretion for the Industrial Commission to fail to refer 
cases to a medical panel in such cases where the evidence of causal connection between a 
work related event and the injury may be uncertain or highly technical. See Champion 
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). 
The interpretation of the results of tests ordered by Dr. Richard A. Nelson, 
M.D. involve highly technical matters. For example, the readouts of the neurometric 
EEG scan and P-300 scan are found on pages 602-608, and again on pages 674-678 of the 
record. They are out of order and should be connected with the interpretative reports 
found at pages 619 through 622 of the record. Dr. Nelson stated in his 7/14/93 report 
that these tests showed "some degree of low-grade organic mental syndrome" (organic 
brain damage). R-620. Based on this he recommended the PET scan in California. The 
results of this scan are found in the record at 149-150. Dr. Nelson interprets the report 
in the record at 129-131 concluding there to be organic changes in the brain resulting in 
impairment. The explanations are technical, but he attributes the abnormal test results 
to the episode at the Oakridge Country Club. R-131. 
The Industrial Commission's only comment about the tests and reports in 
question is "The report does not alter the Commissions conclusions." R166. No 
further explanation or clarification is given. The Order Denying the Motion for 
Reconsideration (which motion included additional reports from Dr. Gunnar Heuser, 
M.D., neruotoxicologist/immun-ologist) does not even address any of the new evidence 
atall.R171,172. 
There is no evidence like this, either pro or con, anywhere else in the medical 
record. It is objective. It is material. It presents a significant contrast to the 
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information available for the medical panel to examine when it considered the matter in 
February of 1993. At the very least it should have been reviewed by competent medical 
doctors appointed by the Commission. It was a clear abuse of discretion and error for 
the Industrial Commission to refuse to refer the matter back to the medical panel for 
consideration of this new information. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISAPPLIED THE HOLDING IN 
STOKES v. BOARD OF REVIEW WHEN IT DENIED THE APPLICANT 
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT AND COMPENSATION DUE TO AN 
ABNORMAL REACTION TO ABNORMAL EVENTS 
The medical panel did not feel, based on the evidence before it, that Mrs. Giles' 
exposure to the superchlorinated water released in the clubhouse basement had any 
direct causal relationship with her health complaints. However, it did feel that she had 
a psychiatric injury because of her fear that she had been exposed to chlorine gas, and 
because of the behavior of emergency personnel at the scene, and because she was given 
the impression that something was wrong with her blood gases. The panel concluded 
that the events of the episode created a "mental stress arising out of her employment 
and was beyond that ordinarily encountered by people in life and employment in 
general." Her past history, which was positive for some psychiatric problems and 
somatic complaints, made her vulnerable to the events of the episode on September 7, 
1991. As a result, the panel suggested that Mrs. Giles be given psychiatric counseling 
for up to six months. 
The Administrative Law Judge denied this suggestion, basing his denial on the 
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holding in Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 P.2d 56 (Ut. App. 1992). He concluded as 
follows: 
In the Stokes case the Court denied the injured worker's claim on the 
basis that she experienced an abnormal reaction to normal events and 
that the abnormality was created by non-work related incidents. In the 
instant case, as indicated previously, the applicant has a significant 
history of prior psychiatric problems and treatment. But for this non-
work related background, the applicant would not have experienced any 
abnormal reaction to the incident at the Oakridge Country Club. 
R-114. 
The error of the Commission in appliying the holding in the Stokes case to 
the facts here is that Stoke stands for the standard that an abnormal reaction to 
normal events is not compensable where the abnormality is created by non-
work related events. Here, we have an abnormal reaction to abnormal events. 
In Stokes, the claim was made that a post traumatic stress disorder was 
sustained as a result of alleged sexual harassment and retaliatory actions through 
disciplinary proceedings at work. However, it was found in Stokes that the 
sexual harassment never occurred and the disciplinary proceedings were 
conducted according to normal company procedure. 
Mrs. Giles' situation is very different. She had a reaction to abnormal 
events. The spill of the so-called superchlorinated water from the pump area 
where the water and chlorine gas are mixed is not a normal happening at a 
country club where the worker in question was a bookkeeper. This was an 
unusual event. 
Mrs. Giles believed that a rupture of a chlorine line had occurred in the 
basement. She went into the basement to find why two co-workers who had 
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gone in to fix the problem hadn't returned. She was told by a construction 
worker at the club that chlorine could be a serious problem as "you don't mess 
with chlorine gas." She was told to get fans to clear out the basement. 
Emergency personnel were called to the scene and the building was evacuated for 
a short time. 
The Administrative Law Judge implicitly recognized this when he adopted in 
its entirety (R114) the report of the medical panel, who wrote: 
...the fact that there was an incident in which she was informed 
by a fellow employee that there was a chlorine leak in the 
basement and the fact that this was reinforced by other 
professional people at the scene and subsequently does represent a 
mental stress arising out of employment and was beyond that 
ordinarily encountered by people in life and employment in 
general. 
R40. 
The medical panel recognized the pre-existing psychiatric history of Mrs. 
Giles, but it concluded that she would benefit from up to six months of 
counseling because of this event, after which any remaining psychiatric 
problems would be due to her pre-existing history. It recognized that the 
abnormal events of the day at least aggravated any underlying problems that 
Mrs. Giles may have had. 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded on page 12 of his Order that Mrs. 
Giles had an abnormal reaction to the "normal event of leaking chlorinated 
water." R115. This minimization of the event is not supported by the record. 
For the purposes of this appeal, we will concede that there was no true 
chlorine gas leak in the basement. That was the conclusion of the ALJ, and it 
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appears this conclusion is not so lacking in support as to be clearly erroneous, 
nor was it attacked in the Motion for Review. However, it is fully concluded by 
the ALJ that there was a release of superchlorinated water, with resulting smell 
or fumes, due to a rupture in a line leading from a pump in the clubhouse 
basement. 
The transcript from the hearing discloses the following evidence: 
a. Michael Whitely of the Oakridge Country Club testified that he 
came after the leak was discovered, but he believed a small amount of actual gas 
escaped from the pump hose following a power shutoff (R239) and that two 
employees went into the basement and smelled it (R239) and reported this back 
to Mrs. Giles, who got very excited and even passed out during the course of 
the events. R255. 
b. Lynn Groves, maintenance man at the Oakridge Country Club, 
testified that he examined the pump area in question two days after the incident 
and found a brass line to have popped off at the pump, which would have 
released what he termed superchlorinated water, which "smells very strong, sort 
of like bleach, like chlorine." R311. "It definitely has a very strong odor to it." 
R317. 
c. Marsha Jones of the Oakridge Country Club testified that she was 
in the kitchen of the clubhouse and buffet table area on the main level on the 
day of the incident and didn't smell any chlorine fumes from where she was at. 
R326,327. She testified that firemen went through the building. She verified 
that there was a lot of confusion in the building due to the episode. R327. 
d. Thomas Mooso, an investigator for the Industrial Commission, 
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Utah Department of Safety and Health, testified that chlorine gas falls rather 
than rises unless it is very warm, and such would explain why no one smell 
fumes on the main level of the building. R337. 
e. Glenda Giles testified in her own behalf at the hearing. She stated 
she was told by a co-worker that there was a chlorine leak in the basement of the 
clubhouse. She was soon told by two co-workers that they were going to turn 
off the chlorine. R281. She asked a man working on a remodeling of the 
clubhouse for some large fans, which was recommended to her by the pool 
manager via a telephone call. The construction worker told her to immediately 
call the fire department, that "you don't mess with chlorine gas," and that the 
fire department should be asked to bring oxygen breathing masks. She did this. 
R281,282. 
Mrs. Giles soon realized that the two co-workers had not returned 
and so she went into the basement to find them. She went outside to the north 
side of the building and at the top of the basement stairs was able to smell 
chlorine. She went down the stairs to a door and opened it. The basement 
below was dark and dimly lit. She called for the two boys and because of no 
answer descended further into the basement. She testified by then she was 
having a hard time breathing, her nose and eyes were running and she was 
having a hard time breathing. She felt dizzy and nauseous. She then took a deep 
breath and screamed the names of the two boys. When they answered she 
learned that they were actually outside. She then left the basement. R282,283. 
When the fire department arrived, she was asked to evacuate the ladies' 
area inside the building, which she did. She found some locked doors inside and 
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learned they had been locked because of the chlorine gas concern. She was told 
by a policeman that the gas was drifting north and that she should get out of the 
building. She went to the kitchen where she passed out momentarily after sitting 
down. She was thereafter taken to the emergency room at a nearby hospital. 
R283-285. 
From the record, it is seen that the event is wrongly characterized by the 
ALJ when he concluded that the episode involved only the normal event of 
leaking water. At the time, it was believed there had been a release of chlorine. 
The fumes from the superchlorinated water were characterized as having a very 
strong smell. This was a very stressful event for Mrs. Giles who was concerned 
about the safety of the two co-workers who she thought were in the basement, 
and who then made what she felt was a personal risk by going into the basement 
to try to find them. She reacted to the smell. Based upon the reports of Dr. 
Nelson and the test results, whatever amounts she inhaled when she went into 
the basement, it was enough to cause the organic problems set forth in the 
reports. But, aside from this, it resulted, as set forth by the medical panel, in 
psychiatric injury, which, although not permanent, is in need of treatment. 
The conclusions of the ALJ and Industrial Commission denying benefits 
for this are against the clear weight of the evidence and are clearly erroneous. 
Stokes does not apply to bar benefits for an abnormal reaction to abnormal 
events. On this point the Industrial Commission should be reversed and 
benefits as described by the medical panel should be awarded.. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case shoud be remanded back to the Industrial Commission for a referral of 
the new medical evidence back to the medical panel. 
The Industrial Commission's conclusion that the Applicant is not entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits for temporary aggravation of her psychiatric condition 
is not supported by substantial evidence and should be overturned and benefits should 
be awarded. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of^anuarV, 1995 
Phillip B. Shell 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. FFNDFNGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
B. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
C. ORDER DENYFNG MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
A. FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92-693 
GLENDA W. GILES, * 
Applicant, * 
* 
VS. * FINDINGS OF FACT 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and/or * AND ORDER 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF * 
OF UTAH, * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 4, 
1993, at 1 o/clock p. m., the same being pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Pete N 
Vlahos, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Richard G. 
Sumsion, Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and referred 
to a Medical Panel for its evaluation. The Medical Panel Report 
was received and distributed to the parties. The applicant filed 
an objection to the Report indicating her belief that the Panel had 
not been given the records of Dr. Gummow and others. However, a 
review of the file and the Panel Report indicates that those 
records were forwarded to the Panel. Accordingly, the applicant's 
objections are without merit and should be dismissed. The Panel 
Report is hereby admitted into evidence. 
The applicant also submitted records from her social security 
proceeding which have also been reviewed by the Administrative Law 





FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Glenda W. Giles, commenced employment 
with the Oakridge Country Club as an office manager on June 3, 
1991. At the time of the second interview prior to being hired, 
the manager of the country club noticed that the applicant had a 
chronic cough and her eyes watered. Shortly after the applicant 
was hired, she had a dental problem, which required that she take 
time off from work. Thereafter, the applicant had numerous medical 
problems as did her son which necessitated her absence from her 
employer. 
Shortly after the applicant began work at the Oakridge Country 
Club, the country club purchased a new computer system. The 
applicant was to be trained by the bookkeeper, Lynne N. Barnes, in 
the operation of the computer. Ms. Barnes testified that because 
of the applicant's numerous absences from the office, she was 
unable to accomplish much training of the applicant. The need for 
training arose because Ms. Barnes was pregnant and would be leaving 
soon to have her baby. Ms. Barnes testified that she was 
instructed that she was to train Ms. Giles in the necessary 
functions to be performed by a general office manager. The office 
manager position had opened up because the prior incumbent, Audrey 
Sager, had reached the age of 65 and had decided to retire, 
however, after Ms. Sager retired, she concluded that she did not 
want to stay at home full time, and so, she requested a half-time 
position and was given such as the accounts receivable clerk. Ms. 
Sager also testified that shortly after the applicant started her 
employment, she was sick. Ms. Sager testified that the applicant 
had a persistent cough, sinus problems and a tooth problem. In 
addition, she also testified that the applicant's son had sustained 
an industrial injury to his back and that the -pplicant spent a lot 
of time taking her son to the doctor a*.a to various other 
locations. 
Ms. Sager also testified that the applicant was ill equipped 
to handle the job of office manager at the Oakridge Country Club. 
Ms. Sager testified that shortly after the applicant had been hired 
by the country club, she was called by Ms. Giles one day and asked 
to meet her in the bar. When Ms. Sager met with Ms. Giles, Ms. 
Giles wanted to know what the general ledger was. It seems that 




McDonnell Douglas, would pay bills for the various departments, but 
had no responsibility or experience with preparing departmental 
budgets and seeing to it that they were adhered to, which is 
required at the club with its general ledger system. The 
applicants performance did not improve. On August 26, 1991, Ms. 
Barnes had her baby, and, as such, was unavailable for six weeks 
following. 
On September 7, 1991, the events which prompted the filing of 
a claim in this matter occurred. On the morning of September 7, 
1991, there apparently was a flood in the kitchen, which damaged? 
some of the tiles on the ceiling. After that crisis was taken care 
of, the next events which took place bring us directly to the 
matter in controversy in this case. Towards the late morning of 
September 7, 1991, the applicant, in her capacity as office 
manager, directed an employee, Paul Spencer, to take some things to 
the basement of the country club. Mr. Spencer reported back to the 
applicant that there was a chlorine leak in the basement. The 
applicant attempted to call Mr. Whitely, the manager of the club, 
but he was not at home. She then called the pool manager, who 
informed her that the leak that was being complained of might be a 
back wash of chlorinated water. The pool manager then asked to 
speak to Mr. Spencer and, after doing so, Mr. Spencer left. Mr. 
Spencer then returned with Jake Thompson, a co-employee. The pool 
manager informed Ms. Giles that if she had some big fans, she 
should use those to remove the smell from the country club. When 
the applicant inquired of the general contractor, who was 
performing remodeling duties, if he had any fans, he informed her 
that if there was a leak of chlorine gas, she should contact the 
fire department. Ms. Giles promptly got off the line with the pool 
manager and called the Farmington Fire Department. 
Ms. Giles went to the top of the stairs and at that time 
smelled chlorine. She then went down the stairs looking for 
Thompson and Spencer, and called to them but received no answer. 
The applicant testified that her eyes were burning and her nose was 
running, and that she yelled as loud as she could and, at that 




The fire department arrived and some employees were evacuated. 
The part-time interior decorator for the club testified that she 
was not evacuated, although she was working in the office at the 
time of all of the confusion. She also testified that she noticed 
no smell of chlorine upstairs whatsoever. 
The applican went on to testify that she was nauseated after 
she had walked into the dining room and that she told the firemen 
that she did not feel good. Two firemen then laid her down on the 
floor and the applicant claims that she was in and out of 
consciousness, the medical evidence does not support that claim. 
The applicant was taken to Humana Health Davis North for medical 
treatment. 
The applicant came under the care of Dr. Bart Nilson, who had 
the applicant receive a blood gas study as well as conducting a 
physical examination. It was also noted that the applicant has 
Marfan7s syndrome, a connective tissue disorder. The doctor noted 
that the applicant did not have any respiratory difficulty, nor 
could he find any skin irritation or irritation to the mucous 
membranes of the applicant's nose or mouth. With respect to her 
chest, she was given a chest x-ray which was normal. The 
applicant's arterial blood gas study was abnormal, but the doctor 
noted that the applicant was not in any respiratory difficulty and 
was not wheezing. Those results were then sent to the applicant's 
family physician, Dr. Warden. 
The applicant reported to Dr. Warden for treatment of this 
condition initially on September 9, 1991. Dr. Warden's office 
notes for that visit indicate that the applicant's oxygen 
saturation was normal and her oxygen content in volume was also 
normal. Dr. Warden prescribed Fioricet for the applicant. The 
applicant next returned to Dr. Warden on October 21, 1991. At that 
time, the applicant was complaining that her left trapezius was 
having a terrific spasm with some tenderness. The applicant also 
reported: "Wondering if her lapses in memory could be due to 
chlorine and, or, car accident from whiplash." In December of 
1991, the applicant was referred to Dr. Sadler for pulmonary 
studies. Dr. Warden also at that time noted that the applicant had 





In an office note dated December 31, 1991, Dr. Warden makes 
the following interesting observation: "Patient continues to have 
cough with spasms with a chronic bronchitis probably secondary to 
chlorine exposure.11 The interesting thing about the quoted passage 
from Dr. Warden's office notes, is that that office note fails to 
take into account the applicant's pre-exposure history. 
Specifically, on July 12, 1991, for example, Dr. Warden made the 
following entry in his office notes: "Glenda is having a 
persisting bronchial cough that has been productive of some green 
and yellow stuff." The doctor concluded at that time that the 
applicant had chronic bronchitis. Yet six months later, the doctor 
attributes that same chronic bronchitis to the applicant's chlorine 
exposure, which is obviously incorrect. 
Ms. Giles had had problems with bronchitis while working at 
Hill Air Force Base. The applicant told Dr. Gummow that: "[a]fter 
she left this job, she reported no additional significant problems 
with bronchitis." This statement to Dr. Gummow by the applicant 
was not true. It will be recalled that on July 12, 1991, Dr. 
Warden's office notes indicate that: "Glenda is having a persisting 
bronchial cough that has been productive of some green and yellow 
stuff." The doctor concluded that: "Patient has a chronic 
bronchitis." The applicant left her employment at Hill Air Force 
Base in October of 1990. The applicant commenced employment with 
the Oakridge Country Club on June 3, 1991. Therefore, the 
applicant's testimony that she had no further problems with her 
bronchitis after she left McDonnell Douglas at Hill Air Force Base 
is just not true. 
Therefore, Dr. Gummow's finding that: "Mrs. Giles is also 
being followed for a cough which developed after the exposure" is 
also not true. 
The applicant was seen by Dr. Sadler on January 14, 1992, and, 
at that time, Dr. Sadler on page 79 of Exhibit D-l, found: 
"Etiology of sx (symptoms) not apparent from monitoring HR (heart 




On January 28, 1992, the applicant was seen by Dr. Heiny for 
an examination of her sinuses. The applicant had told Dr. Heiny 
that "[s]he has never had a previous history of headaches or pain 
in the sinuses prior to this." Unfortunately, the history given to 
Dr. Heiny by the applicant was not accurate. On cross-examination, 
the applicant admitted that she had chronic bronchitis, sinusitis 
and headaches before September 7, 1991* In fact, a review of the 
medical records of Dr. Hirsbrunner of December 28,-1987, belies 
that contention by the applicant. In that record, there is a 
personal history form, which the applicant completed. Under the 
ear, nose and throat section of that physical complaint sheet, the 
applicant underlined sinus infection, and wrote along side of it: 
"Has been in hospital with them." 
In that same personal history report, which is contained orf 
page 62 of Exhibit D-l, the applicant lists quite a few complaints 
that she was having at that time. It is interesting to note that 
many of the complaints listed there are the same complaints that 
the applicant has now attributed to her industrial exposure of 
September 7, 1991. For example, in 1987, the applicant was 
complaining of fainting, dizziness, chills, sweats, fever, 
headache, fatigue, nervousness, numbness or pain in the arms, hands 
or legs. With respect to the numbness or pain in her arms, the 
applicant has indicated that this had its onset: "after falling". 
A further review of the past health history completed by the 
applicant indicates that in 1970, she fell in the street and 
injured her neck. Sometime afterwards, she had a myelogram in the 
1970's. In 1983, the applicant fell on some ice injuring her right 
shoulder and leg. In 1980, she reported falling from an orchard 
ladder approximately eight feet, fracturing her foot and injuring 
ler right shoulder and hip* In 1981, she sustained an automobile 
accident wherein her neck was injured. In that personal history 
report of 1987, the applicant went on to indicate that she was 
laving a problem with an earache, nosebleeds, dental decay, 
enlarged glands, chronic cough to which she appended the note: "At 
the present hard cough had it last winter, DC in Salt Lake City did 
iiathermy for it." The applicant also complained of a rapid 
oeating heart under the cardiovascular system and under the heart 
iisease section of the form, indicated: "rapid heart rate not 
consistent rate". The applicant also went on to complain of 
constipation, diarrhea, pain over the stomach to which she appended 




On September 22, 1990, the applicant was involved in an 
automobile accident. While she was stopped at a traffic light at 
24th and Monroe Street in Ogden, applicant's car was rear ended. 
At that time, the applicant complained of: 
. . . dizzy, light headed, weak kneed, as if I were going 
to pass out; pain at base of skull, base of spine, 
between shoulder blades, right arm and shoulder, right 
side from shoulder to hip, right knee; couldn't think 
clearly. (Emphasis supplied). 
The applicant's present complaints, are detailed to Dr. Warden 
on page 8 of Exhibit D-2; in that report, the doctor identifies 25r 
symptoms that the applicant attributes to her chlorine exposureJ 
At the time of the hearing, the applicant had some additional 
symptoms that she felt were related to her alleged exposure. Those 
symptoms included #26- Dropping things, #27- Heart races at night, 
#28- Hand numbness, #29- Diarrhea and pain in the stomach. The 
reader may have noticed that the complaints about her heart racing, 
hand numbness and diarrhea, are complaints the applicant had 
already voiced long prior to the industrial events of September 7, 
1991. In that same report, Dr. Warden makes a strange statement. 
That statement being: "She was seen at the Kaysville Medical Center 
shortly after the exposure and was found to have some difficulty 
with respiration. . . ." That foregoing passage is strange, 
because the applicant was not seen at the Kaysville Medical Center 
until September 9, 1991. 
On September 7, 1991, when the applicant was examined at 
Humana Health Davis North by Dr. Nilson, Dr. Nilson specifically 
found: "She does not have any respiratory difficulty." The doctor 
also observed that the applicant did not have any wheezing. 
Therefore, Dr. Warden's entry that two days after her examination 
at the hospital, the applicant was having respiratory difficulty, 
is a very strange entry indeed. Further, in reviewing the office 
note for that first visit to the Kaysville Medical Center on 
September 9, 1991, I see no mention in the doctor's office notes of 
any respiratory difficulty being suffered by the applicant. 
Rather, the doctor only noted that the applicant was still 
complaining of a headache, but he specifically noted: "No longer 
feels extremely ill." Therefore, the doctor's finding that the 
applicant was having respiratory difficulty when he saw her on 
September 9, 1991, is not supported either by the medical records 
of Humana Health Davis North facility or is that finding supported 




On further cross-examination, the applicant admitted that in 
1979, she was admitted to the hospital complaining of chronic 
fatigue and joint pain. 
On November 25, 1992, the applicant received an additional 
blood gas study which indicated that her pulmonary function was 
within normal limits. 
The applicant has also had some pre-existing psychiatric 
problems. The applicant has a multiple personality disorder and an 
organic mental disorder as diagnosed by Dr. Gummow. Dr. Gummow 
describes the applicant's psychiatric history as: "Traumatic child 
and adult psychiatric history." 
The applicant has complained of mental confusion and lack of 
mental quickness as the result of her alleged gas exposure at 
Oakridge Country Club. The Administrative Law Judge had the 
opportunity to observe the applicant at the evidentiary hearing for 
approximately four hours. During that time, the Administrative Law 
Judge noted that the applicant, while teary on occasion, did not 
exhibit any signs of mental confusion or lack of mental quickness. 
Rather, Ms. Giles was well engaged in the prosecution of her 
compensation claim, such that she readily supplied dates to her 
counsel, and also readily corrected misstatements of facts by 
opposing counsel or by others in the courtroom. In addition, the 
applicant was able to prepare a fairly detailed schematic of the 
physical layout of the Oakridge Country Club while one of her co-
employees was being cross-examined by her counsel. Therefore, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the applicant's claim of mental 
confusion resulting from the alleged gas exposure is not credible 
nor believable. 
The reader may have noticed that the Administrative Law Judge 
has referred to the events of September 7, 1991, on occasion as an 
alleged exposure of chlorine gas. The reason for that qualifica-
tion will become much more readily apparent following the upcoming 
discussion. As may be remembered, the applicant testified that she 
was exposed to chlorine gas. However, the testimony of the 
witnesses shows that, in fact, the applicant was not exposed to any 




After the fire department had arrived on September 7, 1991, 
the department assigned its Hazardous Materials Investigator to 
look into the situation in the pool room. The investigator 
testified that he did not smell any chlorine when he arrived at the 
country club. He also testified that he did not observe the 
applicant, but did note that she had been transported to the 
hospital. Mr. Parker testified that he first noticed a chlorine 
smell when he got to the swimming pool pump room. He testified 
that he put on his self-contained breathing apparatus to check out 
the area. He also testified that chlorine gas presents a 
significant health risk. He went on to testify that chlorine rises 
in warm weather and normally would cling to the ground otherwise. 
Mr. Parker opined that the brass line carrying gas from the C02 tank 
to the pump unit caused chlorine gas to be released. However, in 
carefully reviewing the written report prepared by Mr. Parker, the 
following passage is noted: "There was a leak at this pump that 
permitted pressurized chlorine gas in water to enter the 
atmosphere." This last passage is critical, because listening to 
Mr. Parker's testimony, one was left with the impression that the 
chlorine gas by itself was escaping into the atmosphere of the pump 
room. However, this is not what occurred. 
Mr. Groves, the maintenance manager, testified that he 
reported to work on Monday morning following the chlorine incident, 
Saturday, September 7, 1991. Mr. Groves testified that when he 
reported to work on Monday morning, September 9, 1991, he was 
informed of the problem with the swimming pool, and so he went to 
the pump room to investigate the situation. Mr. Groves testified 
that there was a leak of superchlorinated water from the brass 
line, but no gas had escaped. He further testified that the 
chlorine gas line did not come off as seems to have been intimated 
by Mr. Parker. 
Tom Mooso, Utah Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH) 
investigator, was also called and testified. Mr. Mooso took issue 
with Mr. Parker's testimony that chlorine would have risen on 
September 7, 1991. Mr. Mooso testified that chlorine falls not 
rises, except under extremely warm temperatures. The 
Administrative Law Judge being puzzled by this apparent discrepancy 
between two individuals who should know these matters, investigated 
this particular aspect of the claim further. The Administrative 
Law Judge is informed and takes judicial notice of the fact that 
chlorine has a specific gravity of 3.24, while oxygen or air has a 




chlorine is 3.24 times heavier than air. Accordingly, Mr. Parker's 
testimony that the chlorine gas, had any leaked, would have been 
expected to rise is factually untrue. As Mr. Mooso testified 
chlorine would only rise under extremely warm temperatures. The 
witnesses for the applicant and the applicant, herself, testified 
that September 7, 1991, was a rainy cool day. Therefore, it was 
factually impossible for the chlorine to have risen as alleged by 
Mr. Parker. 
Further, Mr. Mooso testified concerning the inspection he 
conducted at the Oakridge Country Club. Mr. Mooso testified that 
upon arriving at the Country Club, he was met by Mr. Whitely, who 
informed him what had occurred. According to Mr. Whitely, the 
chlorine line from the gas bottle had burped into the atmosphere. 
However, Inspector Mooso testified that when he inspected the line, 
the "bivalve was still intact, and, as such, that indicated to him 
that there had been no leak of gas as thought by both Mr. Parker 
and Mr. Whitely. Rather, Mr. Mooso explained that had the line 
come off the chlorine bottle, there would have been a continuous 
emission of chlorine gas into the pool room. As testified to by 
Mr. Groves, when he arrived on Monday, September 9, 1991, for work 
that morning, he observed that the line from the chlorine bottle to 
the insertion pump was intact. Rather, the line that had come 
loose was the line from the pump which contained superchlorinated 
water. Mr. Mooso testified that a citation was not written up for 
a chlorine gas release because no chlorine gas release occurred. 
Having weighed all the testimony and evidence on this 
particular subject, I find and conclude that there was no release 
of chlorine gas on September 7, 1991. Rather, there was a spill of 
superchlorinated water onto the ground. As testified to by both 
Mr. Groves and Mr. Mooso, superchlorinated water is not the 
equivalent of chlorine gas. Rather, superchlorinated water is 
analogous to spilling liquid bleach on one's floor, which is 
basically what occurred in this particular situation. Therefore, 
I find that the applicant was not exposed to chlorine gas, but 





With the file in this posture, case was referred to the 
Medical Panel to determine if the applicant's constellation of 29 
complaints were medically related to the industrial incident of 
September 7, 1991. The Panel concluded and found that the 
applicant's constellation of complaints were not directly related 
to the industrial event of September 7, 1991. Rather, the Panel 
found: "The applicant did not receive a toxic dose of chlorine gas 
per se, but thought she had inhaled something noxious because of 
the smell she perceived." The Administrative Law Judge has 
reviewed the medical and other evidence on this file, and I find 
that the foregoing formulation by the Panel is reasonable and I 
hereby adopt those findings as my own. 
The Panel went on to observe that the applicant's " . . . rich 
history of past psychiatric problems and somatic complaints and a 
work relationship of great concern to her at the time. . ." made 
the applicant " . . . highly vulnerable to any anxiety provoking 
event such as what she interpreted as having happened on 7 
September 1991." (emphasis added) The Panel also found " . . . that 
any longer term residual psychiatric symptoms are a reflection of 
past psychiatric trauma and associated problems, rather than having 
symptoms indefinitely from her misperception of that single event." 
The relevant case law governing this matter is found in the 
decision of Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah App. 
1992). In the Stokes case the Court denied the injured worker's 
claim on the basis that she experienced an abnormal reaction to 
normal events and that the abnormality was created by non-work 
related incidents. In the instant case, as indicated previously, 
the applicant has a significant history of prior psychiatric 
problems and treatment. But for this non-work related beckground, 
the applicant would not have experienced any abnormal reaction to 
the incident at the Oakridge Country Club. 
As already found, the applicant was not in fact exposed to 
chlorine gas, and she did not sustain any physical injury from the 
smell associated with the malfunctioning chlorinator. In fact, the 
two individuals who actually entered the pump room to inspect the 
chlorinator , were in nuch closer proximity to the leaking 
chlorinated water, but suffered no ill effects from their 
experience. Further, the hazardous materials investigator 




applicant claims she could smell chlorine. Rather, Mr. Parker 
stated that the chlorine smell was first noticed upon entering the 
pump room itself, which the applicant did not enter. Therefore, 
his testimony casts serious doubt on the applicant's testimony that 
she could smell chlorine upstairs or partially down the staircase. 
Further doubt is also cast by the testimony of the interior 
decorator who was upstairs at the time of the incident and did not 
smell any chlorine whatsoever. 
Based on the foregoing, I find that the applicant may believe 
that she was exposed to chlorine gas, but that belief does not 
prove that an exposure actually occurred. Rather, the 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that the applicant was not 
exposed to chlorine gas on September 7, 1991. Instead, the 
applicant may have smelled some of the leaking chlorinated water, 
which she then misperceived as a toxic leak of chlorine gas. The 
applicant's severe anxiety attack was an abnormal reaction to the 
normal event of leaking chlorinated water, and the applicant's 
extreme reaction or abnormality was a product of the applicant's 
organic mental disorder and prior psychiatric trauma and associated 
problems which were unrelated to her employment. Therefore, the 
applicant has failed to establish legal causation and as such her 
claim must be dismissed. The applicant has also failed to 
establish medical causation. The medical evidence stands for the 
proposition that the applicant's 29 complaints are of a 
longstanding nature, and were clearly complained or and treated 
prior to the events of September 7, 1991. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The applicant has failed to establish legal and medical 
causation in this matter, and as such her claim of an industrial 
accident on September 7, 1991 should be dismissed with prejudice. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Glenda Giles 
alleging a compensable accident on September 7, 1991 should be and 




IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular erros and 
oobjections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review 
is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commsision, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this 15th day of July, 1993. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on July 15, 1993, a copy of the attached 
Order in the case of Glenda Giles was mailed to the following 
persons at the following addresses, postage prepaid: 
Glenda Giles 
P.O. 411 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Richard Sumsion, Esq. 
WCFU 
P.O. 57929 
SLC, Utah 84157 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
^ ^ w v x &QQp.*n 
Tim Allen 
B. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
GLENDA W. GILES, * 
A p p l i c a n t , * 
* ORDER DENYING 
v s . * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and * Case No. 92-0693 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
Defendants. * 
Glenda W. Giles seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's 
Order which denied her claim for workers' compensation benefits. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-2-102(2), Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code 
R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ's decision dated July 15, 1993. 
In summary, Mrs. Giles was employed as office manager at 
Oakridge Country Club from June 3, 1991. She has a long history of 
various ailments which predate her employment at Oakridge. On 
September 7, 1992, highly chlorinated water leaked into the 
Oakridge office basement. Mrs. Giles experienced some minimal 
exposure to the chlorinated water. 
After the foregoing incident, Mrs. Giles suffered a severe 
anxiety attack. She believed that her preexisting ailments had 
become more severe after the incident. There is no substantial 
evidence in the record to support Mrs. Giles' belief. However, the 
record does establish that her reaction to the incident was 
abnormal and unrelated to her employment at Oakridge. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act compensates workers for 
injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45. However, an abnormal reaction to normal 
events is not compensable where the abnormality is created by non-
work related incidents. Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 P.2d 56, 61 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
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In this case, Mrs. Giles experienced an extreme emotional 
reaction to her discovery that super chlorinated water was leaking 
in the country club basement. While an event such as occurred at 
Oakridge is not a frequent occurrence, it also was not a 
particularly serious or alarming incident. As noted by the ALJ, 
the reasons for Mrs. Giles' reaction were not related to her 
employment. Furthermore, the medical evidence does not establish 
that her ailments are related to the incident. Consequently, Mrs. 
Giles has failed to establish her right to workers' compensation 
benefits. 
The Commission is aware of the report of Dr. Nelson, submitted 
for the first time after the ALJ had issued his decision. In the 
interest of efficiency and fairness, the doctor's report -should 
have been submitted at the hearing conducted by the ALJ. However, 
the report does not alter the Commission's conclusions. 
In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds, as did the 
ALJ, that Mrs. Giles has failed to establish that she is entitled 
to benefits under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the Administrative Law Judge's Order, 
dated July 15, 1993, and denies Mrs. Giles' Motion For Review. It 
is so ordered. 
DATED this C? &* day of June, 1994. 
IMPORTANT! NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT^ PAGE 






Industrial Commission of Utah 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party .may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage a copy of the ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the 
case of GLENDA GILES, Case Number 93-0693, on //^2X day of June, 
1994 to the following: 
GLENDA GILES 
P O BOX 411 
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037 
RICHARD SUMSION, ESQ. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157 
AH\92-0693o 
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OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
Glenda W. Giles asks the Industrial Commission of Utah to 
reconsider its previous Order denying Ms- Giles' claim for workers' 
compensation benefits. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §63-46b-13 and 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.0. 
DISCUSSION 
In response to Ms. Giles' Motion For Reconsideration, the 
Commission has once again carefully reviewed the record in this 
matter. Based on its review, the Commission again concludes that 
the ALJ properly denied Ms. Giles' claim for workers' compensation 
benefits. As noted in the ALJ's decision: 
. . . (Ms. Giles) may believe that she was exposed to 
chlorine gas, but that belief does not prove that an 
exposure actually occurred. Rather, the preponderance of 
the evidence indicates that the applicant was not exposed 
to chlorine gas on September 7, 1991. . . . (T)he 
applicant's extreme reaction or abnormality was a product 
of the applicant's organic mental disorder and prior 
psychiatric trauma and associated problems which were 
unrelated to her employment. 
The foregoing conclusions of the ALJ are fully supported by 
persuasive medical opinion, as well as other evidence in the 
record. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 92-0693 




In light of t-he foregoing, the Commission reaffirms its prior 
decision in thi? matter and denies Ms. Giles' Motion For 
Reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
T>KT£T> this 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
A4+1 
<5ollee'n S. Coiton 
Commissioner 
=*£20. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may" appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a Petition For Review with that Court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Alan Henn^bold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage a copy of the ORDER DENYING MOTION" FOR 
RECONSIDERATION in the case of GLENDA GILES, Case Number 93-0693, 
JdCA. day of July/ 1994 to the following: on 
RICHARD SUMSION, ESQ. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157 
AH\92-0693o 
PHILLIP B. SHELL 
DAY &' BARNEY 
45 EAST VINE STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
ilan Herinebol 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
